01 · John Locke

John Locke

John Locke (1632–1704) was an English physician and philosopher who wrote during the crises that ended Stuart absolutism. His Two Treatises of Government and his Letter Concerning Toleration both appeared in 1689, the year after the Glorious Revolution. In them he argued that people have rights before any government exists. Government is a limited trust, set up by consent to protect those rights, and it can be removed when it betrays that trust. The models below put his arguments into motion: households without a judge, families enclosing a commons, a people deciding how much power to hand over.
Eight households share a countryside. Disputes arise at random. In the state of nature the wronged party judges and punishes. If the punished side, partial to itself, thinks the punishment unjust, it retaliates, and a dispute becomes a feud that spreads to allies. In civil society the same disputes go to a known law and an impartial judge.

Eight households, one countryside

season 0
100Ashby100Brook100Carew100Dale100Eyre100Fenn100Gage100Hale
red = feud (thicker = hotter)green = dispute settledblue = taken to the judgecircle size = household wealth
disputes
0
settled peacefully
100%
active feuds
0
0 started so far
wealth destroyed
0
total wealth
800
starts at 800

Feuds and wealth over time

012340season
02004006008000season

Try: run the state of nature at 60% partiality until two or three feuds are burning, then switch to civil society. The disputes keep coming at the same rate, but they now end at the judge instead of in raids. Set partiality to 0% in the state of nature: with perfectly fair men, Locke's state of nature is peaceful.

Families arrive one by one and enclose the tiles nearest their homestead, making them property by working them. A cultivated tile yields ten times what it yields as commons. Under the spoilage limit nobody takes more than they can use. Once money exists, a surplus can be saved as silver and spent hiring hands, so holdings can grow without limit.

The commons, tile by tile

proviso holds: enough and as good left
dark green = unowned commons (yields 0.1)colored = cultivated by a family (yields 1, or 1.5 once money makes it worth growing for sale); dot = homestead
families
3
0 with land · 3 landless
commons left
240 tiles
a newcomer needs 5
largest holding
0 tiles
land Gini 0.00
produce spoiled
0
surplus with nothing durable to trade it for
total output
24
the same land as untouched commons: 24

Land enclosed and output

share of land enclosed (×100)total output
050100year

Try: run the spoilage economy to 60 families. Each holding stops at 5 tiles (all a family can use before the plums rot), so the commons lasts until about 48 families. Reset with money: industrious families save silver, hire hands and enclose far more, so the proviso breaks much sooner. Total output climbs too, and landless families earn a wage well above what foraging the shrinking commons would give them, which is Locke's defense of the result.

The proviso is the most disputed part of Locke's theory. Georgists and left-libertarians say that once land runs out, latecomers are owed compensation for the commons they lost. Locke, and later Nozick, answered that the proviso is met if latecomers end up better off than they would have been in the unimproved commons, for instance as well-paid laborers.
Trust in the legislature drops with every breach and slowly recovers under good government. Locke expected people to put up with honest mistakes. A single breach is forgiven, but repeated breaches add up to a 'long train of abuses' that reveals a design. Each new one then weighs more, until the people take back the power they entrusted.
Make the government breach its trust:

The people's trust in the legislature

month 0 · government #1
050100050100monthappeal to heaven: the people resist
trust
75
train of abuses
0
breaches in the last 36 months; each one weighs 0.8× next time
governments dissolved
0
recent
  • nothing yet

Try: press Run with ordinary mistakes only; trust dips and recovers forever, because Locke thought people bear much from rulers before they resist. Then click one breach: it hurts, but is forgiven. Now click three or four breaches in quick succession: each weighs more than the last, because a pattern reveals a design, and trust falls through the line.

Toleration: force can make hypocrites, not believers

locke-toleration
A parish with four confessions. Belief changes only by persuasion between neighbors. When the magistrate enforces one church, the punished either conform outwardly or resist. Each person is drawn with an outer ring (what they profess) and an inner dot (what they believe), so you can see the difference.

A parish of 180 souls

year 0
Established churchDissentersQuakersCatholicsring = outward profession · dot = actual belief · red = clash
outward conformity
53%
what the magistrate can count
sincere members
53%
what the church actually has
hypocrites made
0
profess one faith, hold another
clashes (last 20 yrs)
0
0 total · grievance 0.00

Profession vs belief, and conflict

outward conformity %sincere members %
050100year
year

Try: run the established church for 100 years. Outward conformity (dashed) climbs, but the sincere line hardly moves: force fills pews, not minds, and the clash count keeps rising. Switch to toleration mid-run: people profess what they believe, grievances fade, and the clash curve flattens.

Leviathan vs limited government

locke-vs-absolutismlocke-natural-rights
Three societies have the same luck in rulers over 200 years. With no common power, plunder eats a third of everything. Hobbes's absolute sovereign keeps the peace but takes what it likes, and a tyrant stays for his whole reign. Locke's limited government taxes by consent and, after a few years of abuse, removes a tyrant. Families invest only as far as they expect to keep the fruits.

What a typical family keeps, per year

year 200
state of nature (no common power)Leviathan (absolute sovereign)limited government by consent
0100200300400050100150200yearincome kept
red bands = a tyrant on the throne · green lines = a tyrant removed under limited government
state of nature
40
plunder eats ~⅓; nobody plants for others to reap
Leviathan
170
takes 13% now; no remedy against the ruler
limited government
435
3 tyrant(s) removed

Hobbes, Leviathan (1651)

Without a common power, life is a war of all against all and there is “no place for industry.” Fear drives people to hand an undivided, unaccountable sovereign everything, because any limit invites a return to war. In this model he is right that the Leviathan beats anarchy.

Locke, Second Treatise (1689)

Escaping polecats and foxes by submitting to a lion is no bargain. People enter society to protect their property, so a power that can take it at will defeats the purpose. Government is a trust with limits, and a people can remove a trustee who betrays it.

Try: set tyrant chance to 0%. A benign Leviathan does almost as well as limited government, which is Hobbes's best case. Now raise it to 50%: every tyrant on an absolute throne drags income down for a whole reign, and fear of the next one keeps investment low even after he dies.

  • takeawayRights come first, government second. People leave the state of nature for a practical reason: no one should be judge in his own case. They do not give up their rights by leaving.
  • takeawayProperty begins with labor, and money lets it grow past the spoilage limit. The proviso (“enough and as good”) is where the theory is most contested, and Locke's defense rests on how much improvement raises everyone's output.
  • takeawayPower is held in trust and is limited, divided and conditional. A long train of abuses dissolves the trust, and conscience lies outside the magistrate's reach altogether.

Key concepts · 19

John Locke
  1. State of nature

    The condition of people with no common superior on earth to judge between them: free and equal, but without a settled judge.

    Unlike Hobbes's war of all against all, Locke's state of nature has a moral law and can be peaceful. Its defect is practical: every dispute must be settled by the parties themselves, so it tends to slide into conflict.

    Two Treatises of Government (1689)

    ↑ see it in the visualization
  2. Law of nature

    A moral law knowable by reason that binds everyone even without government: no one ought to harm another in life, health, liberty or possessions.

    Because this law comes first, rights are not gifts of the state. Government's laws are legitimate only insofar as they serve and enforce it.

    Two Treatises of Government (1689)

    ↑ see it in the visualization
  3. Natural rights: life, liberty, estate

    Rights each person has by nature; Locke calls the three together 'property' in a broad sense.

    The whole purpose of political society is to preserve them. The phrase echoes in the US Declaration of Independence (with 'pursuit of happiness' in place of property).

    Two Treatises of Government (1689)

    US Declaration of Independence (1776)Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776)
    ↑ see it in the visualization
  4. Every man judge in his own case

    In the state of nature each person holds the executive power of the law of nature: the right to judge and punish offenses against himself.

    Self-love makes people partial to themselves and their friends, so punishment is seen as aggression and answered with revenge. This 'inconvenience' is the main reason to leave the state of nature.

    Two Treatises of Government (1689)

    Blood feuds in medieval IcelandHighland clan feuds
    ↑ see it in the visualization
  5. Civil society

    The community formed when people give up their private power to punish to the public, gaining an established law, an impartial judge, and a power to enforce judgments.

    Locke's three missing pieces of the state of nature are exactly what civil society supplies. People give up the right to be their own judges, not their rights themselves.

    Two Treatises of Government (1689)

    ↑ see it in the visualization
  6. Labor theory of property

    Each person owns himself and his labor; by mixing labor with something unowned in the commons, he makes it his property without anyone's permission.

    It explains how private property can arise without universal consent, which Locke thought impossible to get. It is the root of the liberal case that property is prior to the state.

    Two Treatises of Government (1689)

    ↑ see it in the visualization
  7. The Lockean proviso

    Appropriation is legitimate only where 'enough, and as good' is left in common for others.

    It limits the labor theory. Critics argue it eventually fails once land is all owned; Locke and later Nozick replied that owners make the land so much more productive that latecomers are still better off than in the commons.

    Two Treatises of Government (1689)

    English enclosuresHomestead Act (1862)Nozick's reading in Anarchy, State, and Utopia
    ↑ see it in the visualization
  8. Spoilage limitation

    No one may take more than he can use before it spoils; letting acorns rot or plums decay offends the law of nature.

    In a world of perishable goods this caps every holding at what one family can use, so there is little inequality and plenty left for others.

    Two Treatises of Government (1689)

    ↑ see it in the visualization
  9. Money by tacit consent

    Durable things like gold and silver, valued by agreement, let people store the surplus of their land without it spoiling.

    Money removes the spoilage cap, which makes large and unequal holdings legitimate in Locke's view, because people consented to money. It also makes land worth improving far beyond subsistence.

    Two Treatises of Government (1689)

    ↑ see it in the visualization
  10. Improvement and the value of labor

    Labor makes the far greater part of the value of things: cultivated land yields ten, even a hundred times what the same land yields left wild.

    This is why enclosure can increase what is left for everyone. Locke contrasted a day-laborer in England with a king of a large territory in America who 'feeds, lodges, and is clad worse'.

    Two Treatises of Government (1689)

    ↑ see it in the visualization
  11. Government as a trust

    The legislative is a fiduciary power, given for a purpose (the preservation of property) and limited by it.

    A trustee who acts against the purpose of the trust forfeits it. That idea turns obedience into something conditional.

    Two Treatises of Government (1689)

    ↑ see it in the visualization
  12. Legislative, executive, federative

    Locke separated the power to make laws, the power to execute them, and the power over war, peace and alliances.

    If those who make laws also execute them, they may exempt themselves from their own laws. Montesquieu later developed the separation of powers further, and it shaped the US Constitution.

    Two Treatises of Government (1689)

    US Constitution (1787)Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (1748)
    ↑ see it in the visualization
  13. Standing laws, not arbitrary decrees

    The legislative must govern by promulgated, established laws applied equally, not by extemporary decrees.

    Known rules let people plan and protect them from the ruler's whim. Freedom, for Locke, is living under a standing rule, not the absence of rules.

    Two Treatises of Government (1689)

    ↑ see it in the visualization
  14. Right of revolution

    When the government acts against the trust, power reverts to the people, who may set up a new legislative; with no judge on earth, they 'appeal to heaven'.

    It answered the charge that resistance means anarchy: dissolving a government is not dissolving society. It was used to justify 1688 and, explicitly, 1776.

    Two Treatises of Government (1689)

    Glorious Revolution (1688)American Revolution (1776)
    ↑ see it in the visualization
  15. A long train of abuses

    People do not rebel over slips of human frailty; only a long train of abuses, all tending one way, makes a design against them visible.

    This is Locke's answer to the fear that a right of revolution invites constant upheaval. The phrase reappears almost word for word in the Declaration of Independence.

    Two Treatises of Government (1689)

    ↑ see it in the visualization
  16. Toleration

    The magistrate's power covers civil interests only; it cannot reach the care of souls, because belief cannot be compelled by outward force.

    Persecution produces hypocrites, not believers, and fuels conflict. Locke's toleration had limits by modern standards: he excluded atheists and those he thought owed allegiance to a foreign prince.

    A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689)

    Toleration Act (1689)Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom (1786)Wars of Religion
    ↑ see it in the visualization
  17. Against absolute monarchy

    Absolute monarchy is not a form of civil government at all, because the monarch remains in the state of nature with his subjects, judge in his own case.

    Against Hobbes and Filmer: escaping polecats and foxes only to be devoured by lions is no bargain. Government must be limited because rulers are men too.

    Two Treatises of Government (1689)

    Filmer's PatriarchaHobbes's Leviathan (1651)Exclusion Crisis (1679–81)
    ↑ see it in the visualization